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In the Allied trials of suspected Japanese war criminals after the Second 
World War, the court utilised a number of legal doctrines, derived from both 
domestic criminal law and international criminal law. The question of how to 
convict those who had ordered war crimes, or allowed them to happen, 
without directly taking part in the crimes, was answered by the doctrine of 
command responsibility. The first command responsibility trial, of General 
Yamashita Tomoyuki in late 1945, resulted in a precedent that was used to 
establish the validity of command responsibility charges. The precedent, 
however, was unclear. Command responsibility could be interpreted as a way 
of holding a commander responsible for crimes committed by his 
subordinates, by virtue of his position as commander. Alternatively, it could 
be interpreted as a way of holding a commander responsible for failing in his 
duty to stop or punish atrocities. This thesis examines the use of the doctrine 
of command responsibility at five Australian trials of officers accused of 
responsibility for the deaths of prisoners of war in the Sandakan-Ranau area 
in British Borneo. It shows that the court applied both interpretations of 
command responsibility, exploiting the doctrine as a flexible legal tool. When 
appropriate, officers were held responsible for failing to discharge their duty; 
when the court was determined to convict officers with limited connection to 
a crime, a strict liability was attached to a commander. At other times, where 
it was evident that an officer himself had directly participated in a crime, 
command responsibility was not used, as the accused could be convicted by 
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Between late 1941 and mid-1942, Japanese military forces made rapid 
advances across the Asia-Pacific region. In the process, they captured a large 
number of Allied prisoners of war (POWs), of whom approximately 22,000 
were Australian. These POWs were held in Malaya, Borneo, Manchuria, 
Formosa, the Netherlands Indies, Korea, Burma, Thailand, Japan and various 
islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where they were utilised as a labour 
force for the Japanese military. Approximately 2700 Australian and British 
POWs were held at a camp at Sandakan, in British Borneo. Over 2000 of 
them died either at Sandakan Camp, or marching 260 kilometres along a 
mountain trail from Sandakan to a camp in the Ranau region, west of 
Sandakan, under the guard of Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) soldiers.
1
  
  After the war, the Australian military held multiple trials for 
Japanese personnel deemed responsible for the deaths of the POWs at 
Sandakan-Ranau. These trials were part of a larger process through which the 
Allied governments sought to bring Japanese war criminals to justice.
2
 In 
these prosecutions, accused war criminals could be charged not only for 
direct participation in atrocities, but also for their indirect participation, as 
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officers in a position of command and control over subordinates who had 
committed the crimes. Such officers were indicted through the legal doctrine 
of command responsibility.
3
 This thesis examines the application of 
command responsibility in five trials of officers prosecuted for the atrocities 
committed at Sandakan-Ranau. 
  The invasion of British Malaya by the IJA began on 8 December 
1941, and culminated in the fall of Singapore in February 1942. 
Approximately 130,000 white soldiers were captured by the IJA during the 
campaign, the majority at the surrender of Singapore.
4
 The Japanese forces 
were underprepared for the massive numbers of prisoners they captured. 
Initially, most of the POWs captured at Singapore were held locally at Changi 
Prison and the Selarang Barracks. To minimize overcrowding at these 
complexes, and also to provide labour for military projects, many prisoners 
were sent out across the conquered territories of Asia and the Pacific. On 17 
July 1942, approximately 1600 POWs from Changi Prison arrived at 
Sandakan in British Borneo, to construct an airstrip for Japanese forces. An 
additional 1100 would arrive between January and April 1943.
5
  
As work continued on the airstrip throughout 1943 and 1944, 
conditions at the camp steadily worsened. IJA guards beat the prisoners with 
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increasing  severity and regularity, while supplies of food and medicine 
became scarcer. Lack of food and medicine, combined with hard labour, 
meant that the POW deathrate rapidly increased. In 1944, Allied bombing 




 In January 1945, shortly after the arrival of a new commander, 
Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, 455 POWs were marched from Sandakan to 
Ranau, over a period of twenty-one days. According to statements made by 
Japanese officers at war crimes trials, the prisoners were moved in order to 
evacuate them from a potential battle site, and in any case, there was 
insufficient food in the Sandakan region to sustain them.
7
 Conditions on the 
march were harsh, and only 295 prisoners reached Ranau. More prisoners 
died after arrival at Ranau, from exhaustion, starvation, and disease. By 26 
June 1945, only six of the POWs who had left Sandakan in this group were 
still alive. In May, 536 more prisoners had been marched to Ranau, of whom 
only 183 survived the journey. On approximately 1 August, only thirty-three 
were still alive at Ranau. At around this time, these prisoners were executed 
by their guards. Approximately 288 POWs had been left behind at Sandakan, 
deemed too sick to take on the second march. They were guarded by a small 
group of enlisted IJA guards, but were left with little shelter, and no food or 
medicine.
8
 The majority were too sick and starved to forage in the 
surrounding forest. In mid-June, seventy-five of the remaining POWs at 
Sandakan were taken on another march, supposedly to Ranau, but none made 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
7
 Lynette Ramsay Silvers, Sandakan: A Conspiracy of Silence (Sydney: Sally Milner 
Publishing, 1998), pp. 188-190. 
8
 Ham, Sandakan, pp. 274, 344, 378. 
4 
 
it further than sixty kilometres. On 13 July 1945, another twenty-three POWs 
were walked to the defunct airstrip and shot. All remaining POWs at 
Sandakan died from starvation and disease.
9
  
During the early stages of the war, Allied governments, including 
Australia’s, had remained hopeful that POWs captured by the Japanese 
military would be treated under the directions of the Geneva Convention of 
1929 The Japanese government had signed but not ratified the convention, 
which meant its provisions were not legally binding upon the Japanese 
government or military. Initial communications between Allied governments 
and the Japanese government suggested the POWs captured by the Japanese 
military would nevertheless be treated according to international law. From 
early 1942 onwards, however, it was clear that Japanese forces had 
committed, and were committing, widespread atrocities against both POWs 
and civilians in occupied territories. In the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, 
Allied governments undertook to bring all war criminals to justice.
10
 
Following the unconditional surrender of Japanese forces in August 
1945, Allied governments began to organise the prosecution of alleged war 
criminals. The most famous trial was the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE), which opened in May 1946 with twenty-eight 
defendants, who represented the senior echelons of both the Japanese military 
and the civilian government. All of the defendants were charged with 
planning and carrying out an aggressive war, and some with other crimes 
including murder, before an international bench consisting of representatives 
                                                 
9
 Reid, Laden, Fevered, Starved, pp. 41-44.  
10




from eleven Allied governments.
11
 Approximately 5700 other members of the 
Japanese military, and some Japanese civilians, were charged with “ordinary” 
war crimes. The governments of the USA, the UK, the Philippines, the 
Netherlands, Australia, Nationalist China, and Franceprosecuted these 
“ordinary” war criminals in national courts, which cooperated with each other 
to some degree, by “trading” suspects and seconding staff. The USSR and the 
People’s Republic of China also prosecuted suspected Japanese war 
criminals, in trials that were separate from those run by the other Allies.
12
  
The national tribunals conducted by the Australian military were 
governed by the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth). The military courts established 
under this act differed from both courts martial and civilian courts. One 
important difference was that evidence which would normally be 
inadmissible as hearsay was allowed. The Australian military argued that it 
would be an injustice if an accused person escaped punishment merely 
because a more desirable form of evidence could not be produced. This 
provision was especially important for prosecuting massacres, where hearsay 
evidence might be all that was available to a prosecutor, if there were few or 
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no survivors. Though in many cases witnesses were produced in court, the 
prosecution and defence cases were also permitted to rely exclusively on 
sworn affidavits of witnesses.
 13
 The courts were not required to publish the 
reasons for their decision.
14
 The explanation is probably that the mixed levels 
of legal training among members of the bench, and the heavy trial workload, 
meant that producing reasoned, written legal judgments would have been 
difficult, and unduly time-consuming. Moreover, the trials were not bound by 
precedent, so there was no need to publish decisions that could be relied upon 
in later proceedings. 
The majority of the staff at the Australian trials were from the 
military. Some had legal training, though many did not. As a safeguard, a 
military lawyer sat as Judge Advocate (JA), to ensure that the War Crimes 
Act was properly followed, to advise the bench on points of law, and also to 
draft a review of the proceedings. At the end of a trial, if the accused was 
found guilty, he was entitled to submit a petition against the finding of the 
court, or the sentence, or both. The petition served as a basic means of appeal, 
as there was no appellate court. After the court’s findings were announced, 
the review by the JA, and any attached petition, were sent to the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), a civilian legal expert, in Australia. The JAG’s duty 
was to review the trial, and any attached petition, and to produce a non-
binding report, which was then sent to the Confirming Officer, who could 
confirm or reject the sentence of the court. At the time of the trials for the 
crimes committed at Sandakan-Ranau, the confirming officer was Lieutenant-
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General Vernon Sturdee, Commander in Chief of the Australian army. 
Sturdee had no legal training.
15
 
A total of fifteen Australian trials for war crimes perpetrated at 
Sandakan-Ranau were held at Labuan, British Borneo, beginning on 7 
December 1945, and ending on 31 January 1946. Two trials were held for the 
events at the Sandakan POW Camp: one of the commandant, the other of 
enlisted soldiers accused of beating prisoners. The first march to Ranau was 
the subject of three trials at Labuan. One was a joint trial of officers who had 
led the march; the other two were of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 
enlisted men. The second march produced five trials. Again, one was a joint 
trial of officers, while the other four were of NCOs and enlisted men. The 
execution of prisoners at the Sandakan airstrip and at Ranau at the end of the 




At Rabaul, New Guinea, 188 Australian war crimes trials were held 
between 11 December 1945 and 6 August 1947. Two of them were related to 
the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities. The first was a retrial of officers accused of 
committing war crimes during the first march. The original trial had been 
                                                 
15
 Aszkielowicz, The Australian Pursuit of Japanese War Criminals.  
16
 D.C.S. Sissons, “The Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations (1942-51)” 
(Berkeley: University of California, War Crimes Study Center, 2006), pp. 16, 33, archived at 
[https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~changmin/documents/Sissons%20Final%20War%20Crimes
%20Text%2018-3-06.pdf], accessed on 28 September 2016; ML17: War Crimes Trial of 
Captain Takakuwa Takuo and Captain Watanabe Genzo, accessed at [https://www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/ICWC710YakuoTakakuwaetal02.pdf]; ML28: War Crimes Trial 
of Captain Hoshijima Susumu, accessed at [https://www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/ICWC27333SusumuHoshijima01.pdf and https://www.legal-
tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/ICWC716SusumuHoshijima02.pdf]; ML36: War Crimes Trial of 
Captain Yamamoto Shoichi, Captain Iino Shigeru, Captain Abe Kazuo, Captain Mizuta 
Ryuichi, Lieutenant Sugimura Shimichi, Lieutenant Hirano Yihikiko, Lieutenant Horikawa 
Koichi, Lieutenant Sato Tatsuo, Lieutenant Tanaka Shojiro, Warrant Officer Gotanda 





overturned by the Confirming Officer, because certain witnesses, although 
available, had not given direct evidence. The second Rabaul trial for the 
Sandakan-Ranau atrocities was of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao, the 
commander of Japanese forces in Borneo during the time the marches to 
Ranau and the execution of POWs at Sandakan took place.
17
  
One of the major issues in pursuing war criminals was that although 
the actual atrocity had often been committed by enlisted men and NCOs, they 
may have been acting on the orders of their superior officers.
18
 The question 
then arose of whether the superior should be held culpable to some degree for 
the crime he had ordered. The doctrine of command responsibility addresses 
this question, by creating a legal responsibility held by a commander for the 
crimes committed by a subordinate. How this responsibility manifested itself 
in practice was subject to different interpretations during the trials of 
Japanese suspects. 
In the post-war trials, the principle of command responsibility was 
first used in the prosecution of General Yamashita Tomoyuki in late 1945; 
formally or informally, the Yamashita verdict then functioned as a major 
precedent for other cases. Yamashita had commanded Japanese armed forces 
during the defence of the Philippines in 1944-1945. In early 1945, Japanese 
troops under his command had committed widespread war crimes, including 
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the rape, torture, and murder of thousands of civilians, and summary 
executions of hundreds of alleged guerrillas. After surrendering to US forces, 
Yamashita was charged with failing to prevent his subordinates from 
committing war crimes, or failing to punish subordinates who had committed 
a war crime. He was found guilty by a US military court in Manila on 7 
December 1945. An appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and rejected. Yamashita was hanged on 23 February 1946.
19
 
In the Yamashita trial, the degree of knowledge required to make a 
commander responsible for preventing or punishing war crimes was a major 
issue. The prosecution argued that the crimes perpetrated by Yamashita’s 
subordinates were so widespread, that either he must have known, or he 
ought to have known, that the crimes were being committed. The prosecution 
stated that if Yamashita knew that the crimes were being committed, and did 
nothing, he failed to prevent their recurrence, or to halt them. In arguing that 
he ought to have known that the crimes were being committed, the 
prosecution claimed a positive duty of a commander to investigate potential 
breaches of international law. Failing to fulfil this duty would amount to 
negligence on the commander’s part, potentially to a criminal extent.
20
 
From the Yamashita trial, two possible interpretations of command 
responsibility emerged. In the first, the charge could be identified as a 
                                                 
19
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separate offence of the superior officer, where the superior officer had failed 
to fully control his troops, or to punish them. This charge could arise when he 
had either known that the crimes were being committed, or he ought to have 
known that they were being committed. In the second interpretation, the 
superior officer was held to be directly responsible for the crime committed 
by his subordinate, meaning that there was no separate offence. This 
interpretation stemmed from an attribution of broad responsibility, where a 
commander is responsible for the actions of his subordinates.
21
 Which of the 
two interpretations was actually used in the Yamashita trial, and on which of 
the two he was found guilty, have been the subject of debate. The answer 
depends on the court’s view of what level of knowledge of the crimes 
Yamashita possessed. If the court held that Yamashita knew of the crimes, or 
ought to have known of them, yet did nothing to prevent them from 
occurring, then it would have found that he committed a separate offence as a 
superior officer. If it found that he did not have knowledge of the crimes, or 
that he did not have the means to know of the crimes, then he would have 
been guilty by the nature of his position as the superior officer at the time of 
the atrocities. The poorly drafted decision published by the court used both of 
these interpretations in its judgment.
22
 
The significance of which interpretation of command responsibility 
was used lies largely in the fairness, and perception of fairness, of the trial. If 
the charge is a separate offence of the superior, where he failed to take action, 
then the accused could attempt to show one of three things:  that he did take 
                                                 
21
 Chantal Meloni, “Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of 
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?”, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5 (2007), pp. 619-623. 
22
 Andrew D. Mitchell, “Failure to Halt, Prevent, or Punish: The Doctrine of Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes”, Sydney Law Review 22 (2000), p. 390. 
11 
 
necessary steps to prevent, halt, or punish the commission of war crimes; that 
he could not have known of the crimes; or that he was not the commander at 
the relevant time. If, however, the commander was held responsible for the 
crimes of his subordinates, and had not known of the crimes being 
committed, there could be no substantial defence to the charge, beyond 
showing that he was not the commander at the relevant time. If the accused 
was the commander at the time atrocities were committed, then under this 
interpretation of the charge, he would be found guilty of committing war 
crimes, simply by virtue of his position. This approach to command 
responsibility raises the issue of “victor’s justice”, as the accused has such a 
limited defence, and is likely to be found guilty.  
Subsequent scholars have disagreed about the grounds on which 
Yamashita was found guilty. W.H. Parks argues that the first interpretation of 
command responsibility was used: Yamashita was found guilty because he 
failed to carry out his duty. Parks’ main evidence is the wording of the 
charge, which explicitly accuses Yamashita of failing to perform his duties as 
commander. Parks further states that the court established that Yamashita 
either did know of the crimes, or ought to have known, and that this 
requirement of knowledge, either actual or construed, means that the charge 
was interpreted as a separate offence of the superior.
23
 M.C. Bassiouni asserts 
that Yamashita was held to be responsible under an almost strict liability, that 
is, the second interpretation, in that he was considered to be criminally 
responsible because he was the superior officer at the time the atrocities were 
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 Chantal Meloni agrees that Yamashita was considered guilty 
through this interpretation, which, in her view, established a strict liability of 
the commander.
25
 Meloni’s argument, however, is heavily flawed. She shows 
that the tribunal found that Yamashita either secretly ordered the atrocities, or 
wilfully permitted them, yet at the same time, she denies that the court made 
any findings of knowledge. Her conclusion is likely influenced by the 
memoir of A. Frank Reel, one of Yamashita’s defence counsel, who also 
asserts that there was no actual finding of knowledge in the final statements 
of the court.
26
 In recent work on Australian hearings at Rabaul, Gideon Boas 
and Lisa Lee argue that the senior officer trials which involved command 
responsibility relied heavily on the judgment of Yamashita’s appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, rather than the original proceedings, and did 
not interpret the charge to be assigning strict liability.
27
  
Regardless of the debate about what exactly Yamashita was held 
accountable for, his case did establish an important precedent, in that a 
commander can be held responsible for the crimes of his subordinates, either 
by his inaction in a specific circumstance, or more generally, by virtue of his 
position. The Yamashita trial achieved considerable notoriety, partly because 
of Reel’s 1949 memoir, which was highly critical of the procedure, the 
charge, and the political influence that had shaped the trial.
28
 The Yamashita 
case has heavily influenced subsequent discussion of command 
responsibility. The two different interpretations of the trial, however, mean 
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that the precedent is not a precise one. Partly for this reason, subsequent trials 




 Most of the scholarly literature examining command responsibility 
does so through the discussion of trials of very high ranking officers.
30
 It is 
less often recognized that command responsibility was used extensively in 
the pursuit of lower ranking field officers. Though enlisted soldiers were 
often the actual perpetrators of war crimes, their immediate superiors, such as 
lieutenants and captains, were frequently held responsible. In the existing 
literature there is a lack of examination of command responsibility as applied 
to junior officers, and little or no discussion of how the doctrine was applied 
to different levels of the chain of command. In this thesis the trials involving 
command responsibility that arose from the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities will 
be used to address this gap in scholarly interpretation. Five command 
responsibility trials (including one retrial) centred on the events at Sandakan-
Ranau. The accused were officers of varying ranks and seniority within the 
command structure. I show that the application of command responsibility 
was not uniform across the five trials. I argue that the reason for 
inconsistency was not confusion over which interpretation was the “correct” 
one. Rather, prosecutors deliberately used whichever interpretation suited 
their requirements as the best means of securing a conviction.  
Literature that deals explicitly with the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities has 
almost exclusively focused on the suffering of the POWs during their 
                                                 
29
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captivity, escape attempts made by POWs, and an aborted rescue planned by 
the Australian military in 1945.
31
 There is almost no material on the resulting 
war crimes trials. An exception is a recent essay by Georgina Fitzpatrick. She 
does not provide detail, however, on the results of the trials, or the application 
of legal doctrines at individual trials. Rather, she concentrates on general 




The major source materials for this thesis are the trial documents from 
the five key trials. The trial transcripts provide the complete record of what 
was said within the court, encompassing the opening and closing addresses of 
the prosecution and the defence, examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses by counsel, and any questioning of witnesses by either the JA or 
the bench. Trial records also include the reports of the JA and the JAG; 
witness affidavits of IJA supply troops, enlisted guards and officers, as well 
as surviving POWs; maps of the Sandakan-Ranau trail; and itemised 
descriptions of military supplies and personal effects of POWs and IJA 
members from around Sandakan-Ranau. In the absence of published reasons 
for the decisions of the bench, combining all of these sources has become the 
established method of examining the judgments in post-1945 war crimes 
trials.
33
 Taken together, these sources provide a good understanding of the 
courts’ reasons for their decisions, and of how points of law were interpreted 
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by the bench. For other war crimes, trial records can often be supplemented 
by memoirs produced by former POWs, but in the case of Sandakan, there 
were very few survivors.
34
  
Trials transcripts and related evidence are generally reliable as 
accounts of what happened in courts. With regard to the events which were 
the subject of the trials, however, the evidence must be interpreted carefully. 
What actually happened at Sandakan-Ranau cannot be fully established solely 
from the records of individual trials. The prosecution and defence supported 
different accounts of what occurred, in relation to whether orders were issued, 
what the orders contained, and the nature of events that took place where 
there are no survivors left to tell what happened. Moreover, the majority of 
personnel records, as well as military supplies, at Sandakan POW Camp were 
burnt by the Japanese military when the camp was abandoned.
35
  
Existing works on the Sandakan-Ranau events show the danger of 
using the trial records uncritically. Such works sometimes advance arguments 
that are not credible, out of readiness to accept trial evidence and arguments 
at face value. Some popular writers, for example, attribute the crimes at 
Sandakan-Ranau to a wider policy of the Japanese military to kill prisoners 
through “enslavement”. Paul Ham states that a plan of “extermination” of the 
POWs at Sandakan was carried out with thoroughness.
36
 Richard Braithwaite, 
the son of one of the surviving POWs, has compared the Sandakan-Ranau 
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experience to the Holocaust.
37
 These claims repeat the prosecutor’s assertion 
in the trials of the junior officers who oversaw the Sandakan-Ranau marches 
that the purpose of the march was to kill the POWs. Such a policy, however, 
makes little sense. POWs could have been, and were, murdered in much more 
straightforward ways. It is far more likely that the POWs were marched to 
Ranau to provide labour for the Japanese military, and perhaps to move them 
away from an expected Allied landing at Sandakan. In popular interpretations 
such as those of Ham and Braithwaite, the deaths at Sandakan-Ranau were 
not only intended by the local officers and commanders, but also by the wider 
Japanese military. Such assertions are probably shaped by the prosecution’s 
efforts at the IMTFE to show that the Japanese government not only knew 
that war crimes were widely committed, but also implicitly condoned them.
38
 
The narrative presented by Ham and Braithwaite is part of a broader 
Australian depiction of POW life under the Japanese military, where cruelty, 
brutality, and murder were allegedly commonplace. It is undeniable that 
atrocious crimes were committed by members of the Japanese military, across 
a large area. Outside of popular history like that produced by Ham and 
Braithwaite, however, scholarly work has seriously undermined the claim that 
a policy of the Japanese military or government decreed that no POWs were 
to survive the war. Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt and Dean 
Aszkielowicz have jointly suggested that the circumstances of the war itself 
were a key factor in the crimes committed by Japanese soldiers.
39
 John 
Dower has shown that Allied propaganda produced inflated accounts of 
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 Figures cited by Gavan Daws reveal that of the 
Australian POWs who died in Japanese captivity, approximately one third 
were killed at sea by friendly fire.
41
  
Arriving at an accurate understanding of what happened at Sandakan-
Ranau, and therefore assessing command responsibility trials, requires a 
balancing of the available evidence. In the absence of other materials, trial 
transcripts and related documents must remain the major sources. These 
sources are not monolithic, in that prosecution statements and evidence can 
be balanced by material produced by the defence, and vice versa. Material 
from one trial can be compared with that from other regions and other 
periods, and checked against accounts in secondary sources.  
The thesis is organised into four chapters. Each chapter discusses the 
proceedings against an officer, or group of officers, in chronological order of 
the trials. The first chapter examines the trial of Captain Hoshijima Susumu, 
who had been the commander of the Sandakan prison camp for the majority 
of the war, and was tried for mistreating and starving POWs. Though the 
prosecutor laid the foundation for a conviction based upon the doctrine of 
command responsibility, it was not fully used in court,  because other 
arguments were available to convict Hoshijima. Chapter Two discusses the 
trial of Captains Takakuwa Takuo and Watanabe Genzo, who  were held 
responsible for the second march of prisoners to Ranau. Takakuwa, as the 
commander of his unit, was by his own admission responsible for the crimes 
committed by his subordinates.  Watanabe’s conviction was based upon a 
more controversial application of the command responsibility doctrine: he  
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was held to be strictly liable for the acts of his subordinates.  Chapter Three 
uses an overturned trial and the ensuing retrial to show how the court applied 
command responsibility across a range of levels of command. Nine officers 
and two non-commissioned officers were charged with murder, or an 
alternative charge of ill-treating POWs, for their part in the first march to 
Ranau. The position of the accused in the chain of command, and the impact 
of superior orders, play an integral part in explaining how command 
responsibility was assigned to the accused across the two trials. The retrial 
also demonstrates how the war crimes court system utilised its “appeals” 
process. The final chapter analyses the trial of Lieutenant-General Baba 
Masao, who was the commander of the IJA in Borneo when the two marches 
to Ranau occurred. The chapter confirms the findings of a number of 
scholarly works that command responsibility was applied to senior officers as 
a separate offence, rather than a strict liability for the crimes of subordinates, 
but I show that the trial was nevertheless influenced by the principle of the 




THE TRIAL FOR THE SECOND MARCH 
 
The first prosecution for the crimes committed at Sandakan-Ranau was of 
Captain Takakuwa Takuo and Captain Watanabe Genzo, of the Japanese 37
th
 
Army. The joint trial was held between 3 January and 5 January 1946, at 
Labuan, British Borneo. Each of the accused was charged with one count of 
murder, for “unlawfully and wilfully causing to be killed numerous unknown 
POWs”. Both officers were also charged with three counts of massacre, for 
killing thirty-three POWs on or about 1 August 1945 at Ranau. Both of the 
accused were found guilty of all four charges, and were sentenced to death. 
Takakuwa was executed on 6 April 1946 at Rabaul, New Guinea. Watanabe 
was executed ten days later, on Morotai Island in the Netherlands Indies.
1
  
The principle of command responsibility was applied in two separate 
ways by this court. Takakuwa admitted to ordering the execution of prisoners 
during the second march from Sandakan to Ranau, and to ordering at a later 
point the execution of thirty-three POWs. The court thus had the necessary 
evidence to show that he was directly responsible for these deaths, in an 
uncontroversial application of the overall theory of command responsibility, 
in which an officer is held responsible if he orders atrocities to be 
committed.
2
 The case of Watanabe, Takakuwa’s adjutant, was more 
complicated. Watanabe had been second in command during the march and 
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the massacres, and, on Takakuwa’s admission, had followed Takakuwa’s 
orders. No evidence was raised during the trial to indicate that Watanabe had 
directly participated in the crimes, either by committing violence or by 
issuing orders for executions. Nevertheless, Watanabe was held to be 
culpable for the deaths of POWs killed by subordinates within his unit, by 
reason of his position as a superior officer. This interpretation of command 
responsibility is one of strict liability. The fact that two interpretations of 
command responsibility featured in the same trial shows that the doctrine was 
used very flexibly, and could be deployed to convict suspects whose 
connection to the commission of crimes was questionable. Enforcing strict 
liability on an officer meant that little defence was available to the accused. 
On 17 May 1945, Captain Hoshijima Susumu, the commander of the 
Sandakan POW Camp since 1942, had been replaced by Takakuwa, who 
arrived with Watanabe. Three days after taking command at Sandakan, 
Takakuwa received orders from 37
th
 Army headquarters to move the 
remaining POWs at the camp to Ranau. At this point, the prisoners were 
extremely sick. They were suffering from a range of diseases, including 
beriberi, malaria and dysentery, and many had to be relegated to stretchers. 
Takakuwa informed his headquarters that many of the POWs were too sick to 
be moved, and that he would need to leave approximately 288 of them at 
Sandakan Camp. Takakuwa alleges that he received no reply, because 
communications between Sandakan and 37
th
 Army headquarters had broken 
down. Heavy bombardment by Allied naval and aerial forces at the time 
21 
 
means that it was highly likely this was true.
3
 At another trial involving 
Takakuwa’s superior, no mention of this communication was made.
4
 
Takakuwa spent the next nine days preparing for the march. On 29 May 
1945, Takakuwa, along with Watanabe and 536 prisoners, left Sandakan for 
Ranau. Before leaving, Japanese personnel burned the camp buildings, along 
with records relating to POWs and IJA personnel.
5
  
The prosecution alleged that events took place as follows. The rations, 
the majority of which were either rice or tapioca, that had been assigned to 
the POWs for the march, amounted to 1.8 kilograms per man, and were 
expected to last ten days. More rations were left at supply dumps along the 
march. However, during the march, the IJA guards appropriated a portion of 
the POWs’ rations, forcing the prisoners to survive on roots, tree shoots and 
insects. Takakuwa expected the march to take twenty days, but it took 
twenty-eight. The survivors arrived at Ranau on the night of 25 June 1945. Of 
the original 536 POWs who had left Sandakan, only 183 arrived at Ranau, of 
whom 142 were Australian. The prosecution alleged that the majority of the 
353 prisoners recorded to have died during the march had been executed. 
Allegedly the IJA guards had been rotated through to the rear of the group, so 
that they could be “blooded” by executing straggling prisoners.
6
 Though 
POWs were certainly executed along the way, it is unlikely that the majority 
of the prisoners were executed. Many more had probably died of sickness and 
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exhaustion. Claims of “blooding” guards were most likely also exaggerated. 
Such claims may have been added by the prosecutor to portray the IJA 
soldiers as unnecessarily cruel and murderous, to help secure a conviction. 
Braithwaite suggests that sick POWs were not the only ones who were shot: 
some IJA members too sick to continue the march were also shot.
7
 
Of the 183 POWs who arrived at Ranau on 25 June 1945, only thirty-
three were still alive at Ranau on 1 August. The rest had died from disease 
and starvation. The three charges of massacre levelled against each of the 
accused state that on or about this day, the remaining prisoners were shot, 
under the orders of Takakuwa, and under the supervision of Watanabe. The 
guards organised the POWs into three separate groups, of officers, enlisted 
men who could walk, and enlisted men too sick to stand. Each group was 
taken to a separate nearby location, shot, and then buried.
8
  
The case for the prosecution was heard in just three hours, and 
consisted entirely of affidavits, mainly from interrogations of IJA soldiers 
who were on the march, and from the six POWs who escaped during the 
march, or while at Ranau. It was not unusual in the war crimes trials for 
prosecutors to rely solely on written statements.
9
 As will be shown, in a 
subsequent trial of those accused of the murder of POWs in the first march 
from Sandakan to Ranau, where the prosecution also relied solely on affidavit 
evidence, a retrial was ordered, on the grounds that it was in the best interests 
of the court to have survivors testify in court, rather than through affidavit. 
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By contrast, in the trial of Takakuwa and Watanabe, none of the court 
members or legal officers objected to the lack of witnesses for the 
prosecution. 
Two survivors of the second march to Ranau, Warrant Officer 
William Sticpewich and Private Nelson Short, supplied witness 
statementsthat had been taken during interviews in Australia. Short stated that 
during the march to Ranau, the IJA used the prisoners to carry ammunition. 
As a result the POWs were able to carry less of their own supplies and 
belongings. Both Sticpewich and Short believed that those who fell to the 
side were then executed by the rear guard of the IJA. Both admit, however, 
that they never saw this actually occur. Both also testified that each morning 
of the march, the POWs who were too sick to continue were held back at the 
rest stop. As the healthier prisoners continued along the trail, they would hear 
rifle and machinegun fire. Those guards who had been left with the sick 
POWs would later meet up with the main body, unaccompanied by any 
prisoners. Both Sticpewich and Short also testified that throughout the march, 
POWs were hit by the guards, with fists and rifle butts, to make them march 
faster. Clothing and personal items of the POWs who died were taken by the 




At Ranau there was no shelter available for the prisoners. Basic 
sanitation and cooking equipment were also lacking. During the first three 
days at Ranau, nineteen prisoners died, mostly from a combination of 
starvation, exhaustion, and diseases such as beriberi, malaria and dysentery. 
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Water for the POWs was supplied from a creek, downstream from the IJA 
latrines and washing station. The prisoners built a raised hut, with those sick 
with dysentery quarantined below the floor. On or about 7 July, Short 
escaped with several other prisoners, including two other survivors of the 
Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, Keith Botterill and Bill Moxham. On 
approximately 28 July, Sticpewich also escaped into the jungle.
11
  
The defence of both Takakuwa and Watanabe relied on witnesses 
from the IJA. Takakuwa called seven witnesses, all of whom testified solely 
to the facts of the march. They largely agreed with the prosecutor’s version of 
events, but denied that the IJA took prisoners’ rations or clothing. They also 
argued that the beatings were less severe, and occurred less frequently, than 
the prosecutor had stated. There was no mention of being cycled through 
execution parties during the march.
12
 Watanabe called only two witnesses, 
who testified to his character.
13
 During the trial, the defence counsel treated 
the two accused as essentially the one defendant when it came to the facts. 
However, as will be shown below, when petitioning against the verdict and 
sentence of the court, the defence treated each defendant as distinctly separate 
from the other.  
The accused themselves gave an account of the march which was 
largely similar to that of the prosecutor, though it differed in some respects, 
especially as to the rations available to the POWs, and how the prisoners 
were executed, and in what circumstances. Takakuwa stated that although the 
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IJA had only allotted 100 grams of rice per day for the prisoners, he instead 
gave them 500 grams, which he collected from food dumps along the trail. 
According to Takakuwa, the IJA guards had more food than the POWs 
because they not only had rations that had been allotted for the march, but 
also emergency rations, which the POWs did not have. Takakuwa maintained 
that he ordered the guards to help the POWs as much as they could. Those 
who could not walk any further were to be shot, not in an act of cruelty, he 
asserted, but rather out of humanity, as it would be barbarous to leave them to 
die alone in the elements, either through starvation or disease. Takakuwa also 
stated that he did not use the company’s machinegun to kill the POWs, 
because it was strictly reserved for anti-aircraft use.
14
 It is likely that 
submachineguns instead were used during the executions.
15
 Though the type 
of gun used probably made little difference to the case, it can be assumed that 
Takakuwa argued the point as a way of indicating that the executions were 
essentially euthanasia, rather than brutal massacres.  
Takakuwa defended his decision to execute the POWs both during the 
march, and at Ranau, by invoking the defence of military necessity. In 
military thinking before the Second World War, military necessity was 
commonly held to allow both individual soldiers and their commanders a 
carte blanche for acts considered to be essential to victory. The majority 
judgment at the IMTFE, however, would later reject the defence of military 
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necessity when it was used to counter charges of ill-treating POWs.
16
 
Takakuwa stated that the prisoners whose execution he ordered had been of 
no further use in moving ammunition, and also that he was concerned that 
they might escape and assist the locals in fighting against the IJA.
17
 The fact 
that a number of the prisoners were incapable of walking, and that most were 
suffering from disease, meant the latter defence was not convincing, because 
the POWs were not capable of performing combat duties.  
Takakuwa made further arguments invoking military necessity. He 
maintained that by the time he ordered the executions, the POWs were 
hindering military operations, because they were potentially a burden on the 
limited supplies of food and medicine to which Takakuwa had access. 
Furthermore, caring for the POWs would have meant that the limited number 
of soldiers under his command would have expended their efforts on those 
who were likely to die.
18
 Though there is no doubt he did order the executions 
of the POWs, Takakuwa’s defence demonstrates the difficult situation he was 
in. Caring for sick prisoners would certainly have placed a heavy burden on 
supplies for his own troops, and on manpower. Moreover, when Takakuwa 
was placed in command of the POWs, they were already severely weakened 
from working on the airfield with limited food and medicine.  
In his examination of the Sandakan-Ranau marches, Ham portrays 
Takakuwa as having no regard for the welfare of the prisoners under his 
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charge; as concerned only with moving his men to Ranau; and as determined 
to use the march to kill off the prisoners. Ham argues that  Takakuwa had 
been given an order that POWs were to be executed as a last resort, when 
they were either no longer useful as labour, or were about to be rescued.
19
 
That Takakuwa did not  claim superior orders for the execution of the POWs, 
or even mention this order which supposedly directed the execution of 
“useless” POWs, entirely discredits Ham’s claim. In contrast, Braithwaite 
claims that the marches were actually orchestrated by Takakuwa, who 
intended to kill the POWs to hide the ill-treatment of prisoners by IJA forces 
during the war.
20
 If this were true it would mean that Takakuwa, in order to 
hide atrocities committed by his predecessor, with whom he had had no 
contact prior to being posted to Sandakan, committed more atrocities himself. 
There is no substantial evidence to support this claim. 
Watanabe’s petition against the finding of guilt on all four charges 
addresses the fact that he was not in command of the march, but rather was 
Takakuwa’s adjutant.
21
 In other words, he claimed the defence of superior 
orders. In March 1945, the United Nations War Crimes Commission had 
unanimously decided that superior orders would not be available as a 
complete defence to a charge. Rather, when superior orders were claimed by 
an accused, and found to exist by the court, they would act as a factor of 
mitigation in sentencing. As such, superior orders did not remove the guilt of 
an accused in carrying out a war crime, but rather served as a method of 
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reducing his culpability for his acts.
22
 The Japanese Imperial Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors of 1882, however, explicitly stated that military 
personnel owed total obedience to their superiors. This instruction, together 
with the harsh discipline meted out in the IJA for disobedience, was a 
common defence used by accused war criminals.
23
 
Watanabe’s petition stated that he had only carried out the orders of 
Takakuwa, and that due to wartime conditions, he could not disobey those 
orders.
24
 Most likely in an effort to counter this defence, the prosecuting 
officer sought to establish in his cross-examination of Takakuwa that within 
the Japanese military, an order could be disobeyed where it was either 
manifestly illegal, or practically impossible to carry out.
25
 If the court 
accepted that Watanabe potentially had a reason and the capacity to disobey 
Takakuwa’s orders, Watanabe’s defence of superior orders would probably 
have been rejected. Furthermore, it is likely that the court took into account 
that Watanabe was of the same rank as Takakuwa, and was not an immediate 
subordinate.   
When the prisoners were executed at Ranau, in early August, 
Takakuwa happened to be bedridden, having been injured in the leg, and 
Watanabe was serving as his representative to the subordinate military 
personnel. On or around 1 August, Watanabe passed on Takakuwa’s order to 
execute the remaining POWs. Watanabe mentioned this in his petition to the 
court, to argue that he had not been responsible for the order. Cohen labels 
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this argument as a “mere conduit defence”, in which the accused claims that 
he merely passed on the order, and had no actual connection to the crime.
26
 
Evidently Watanabe’s claim that he was essentially a messenger was rejected 
by the court, which appears to have thought that relaying an order that was 
manifestly illegal was the same as issuing it.   
It seems unusual, within the greater pattern of Allied war crimes trials 
of Japanese suspects, that Watanabe, an adjutant (a staff officer), was charged 
with war crimes. Often, staff officers either escaped indictment completely, 
or were found not guilty, because Allied war crimes courts operated under the 
principle that staff officers were strictly administrative, with exceptionally 
limited capacity to order, or to control subordinates.
27
 Watanabe’s petition 
stated that a death sentence did not properly reflect his position within the 
command structure, and that commutation of the sentence would be 
appropriate.
28
 The petition, however, was rejected. Probably, the court and 
the Confirming Officer concluded that at the time of the massacres of the 
thirty-three POWs at the beginning of August, Watanabe was in a position of 
some authority and control over the IJA forces guarding the POWs, and so 
they imposed the death sentence. 
After confirmation of the death sentences, Takakuwa was hanged, 
while Watanabe was executed by firing squad. The difference in mode of 
execution may show some, albeit extremely limited, distinction between the 
two sentences. Death by firing squad was seen to be the more honourable 
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method of death for a soldier.
29
 Thus, when the sentence of hanging was 
imposed upon Yamashita and his Chief of Staff, General Muto Akira, the 
latter said “Why can’t they shoot us like soldiers?”
30
 The difference in 
sentencing between Watanabe and Takakuwa probably reflects an assessment 
by the court that Takakuwa, in overseeing the march and ordering the 
massacre of the surviving POWs, was more culpable for the crimes than 
Watanabe was.  
In reviewing the trial of Takakuwa and Watanabe, the JAG wrote that 
one of the defining elements of the crimes was that Takakuwa had no 
superior orders to execute straggling prisoners, or to kill the remaining POWs 
at Ranau in August 1945.
31
 This shows that the JAG, at least, found 
Takakuwa to be fully culpable for the crimes. The JAG did not mention 
Watanabe’s position within the command structure, either as an adjutant, or 
as de facto commander during Takakuwa’s indisposition. Nor did he mention 
Watanabe’s claim of superior orders. The JAG seemed to regard them as 
equally responsible for the crimes committed. The JAG also made a 
definitive distinction between their part in the atrocity and that of the NCOs 
and soldiers who actually shot the POWs during the march and at Ranau, 
stating that the NCOs and enlisted soldiers had a wholly different form of 
responsibility, due to their obligation to obey Takakuwa and Watanabe.
32
 The 
JAG’s assessment clearly shows the broad ranging, yet at times contradictory, 
nature of the doctrines of command responsibility and superior orders. The 
soldiers and NCOs who participated in the march and the massacres were 
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found not to have been fully responsible for what occurred, presumably 
because they did not have command or control over the situation. Yet 
Watanabe, who as a staff officer also had only limited control over the events, 
and was acting under the orders of a superior on that superior’s admission, 
was found to be culpable for the prisoners’ deaths..  
The court’s finding of guilt against Watanabe rests on an 
interpretation of command responsibility that holds a commander to be 
strictly liable for atrocities committed by his subordinates. Cohen and Meloni 
both argue that this was the most common interpretation of command 
responsibility in the trials of Japanese suspects.
33
This case shows that the 
application of strict liability was not limited to senior officers; it was also 
used to convict medium and low ranking field officers. The defining aspect of 
Watanabe’s culpability appears to be that at some point during the events in 
question he had some level of command; he was not convicted because of any 
act that he committed or failed to carry out. He was, in fact, found to be 
responsible both for the crimes of his subordinates, and, to an extent, the 
crimes of his superior. 
Takakuwa, as the superior officer, was clearly responsible for the 
execution of POWs during the march and at Ranau, and for the deaths that 
occurred from starvation and disease. He ordered the executions, and he 
admitted that he was wholly responsible for the prisoners’ deaths. A question 
could have arisen as to whether he was fully culpable, in that the poor 
condition of the POWs when he took charge of them was a matter largely 
outside of his control, and he was not responsible for organising supplies for 
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the majority of the trip. The court, however, evidently did not hold these 
issues to be relevant. Rather than viewing the atrocity in the broader context 
of what had occurred before Takakuwa assumed command, the court was 
concerned only with the immediate issue of the ordering of executions, and 
the deaths of prisoners who died under Takakuwa’s charge. 
Command responsibility was a convenient method of fulfilling the 
goals of the court because it ensured that the military personnel most likely to 
be blamed for the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, both by survivors and by the 
Australian public, received the punishment that had long been promised. 
Takakuwa and Watanabe, because of their actual or perceived command, 
appeared to be responsible for the conditions on the march and at Ranau, and 
for the deaths that resulted. Willingness to enforce a strict liability on superior 
officers made the doctrine exceptionally flexible, because it could be used to 
accuse a large number of personnel. The trial of Takakuwa and Watanabe 
demonstrates that the principle of command responsibility could be used to 
charge and sentence not only officers who had clearly ordered atrocities, but 
also those who had been in a very limited position of control at the relevant 
time. Command responsibility thus allowed a broad-ranging pursuit of 
military personnel considered culpable for atrocities. It became a useful tool 
to ensure that justice functioned in the way that it was expected to function in 





THE TRIAL OF CAPTAIN HOSHIJIMA SUSUMU 
 
The trial of Captain Hoshijima Susumu took place between 8 January and 20 
January 1946, at Labuan. These proceedings focused on the conditions at 
Sandakan Camp, rather than the marches to Ranau. During Hoshijima’s 
command of the camp, approximately 1100 Australian and British POWs 
died from disease, torture, beatings and starvation. After the war, Hoshijima 
was charged with “authorising and permitting POWs in his charge to be 
closely confined under inhuman conditions and beaten”, “authorising and 
permitting POWs in his charge to be tortured and beaten by soldiers under his 
command”, “failing to provide adequate and proper medical care and food for 
the POWs under his charge”, and “authorising and permitting underfed and ill 
POWs in his charge to be used for heavy manual labour and other labour”. 
Hoshijima was found guilty on all four charges, sentenced to death, and 
executed by hanging on 27 February 1946.
1
 
 In this trial, there was a limited focus on Hoshijima’s responsibility 
to control his subordinates, or whether he was culpable for actions 
undertaken by his subordinates, probably because considerable evidence 
showed that he either directly participated in, or ordered, the commission of 
war crimes. Though command responsibility could have been used to a 
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greater extent in the trial, it was not a prominent feature of the prosecution’s 
case because Hoshijima’s direct connection with war crimes was very easy 
to prove. 
The wording of the charges against Hoshijima demonstrates that the 
prosecution anticipated using some form of command responsibility 
accusation. The phrase “authorising and permitting” does not implicate 
Hoshijima in the direct commission of war crimes, but instead relies on his 
position within the command structure of the camp. It shows that the 
prosecution intended to hold Hoshijima responsible for the crimes committed 
by his subordinates. If, instead, the original intent of the prosecution had been 
to argue that Hoshijima was personally responsible for committing the 
crimes, there would have been no need for the wording to connect 
Hoshijima’s authority, or command, to the crimes. Instead he would be 
charged directly with the crime in question. 
The trial of Hoshijima had been preceded by the trial of Captain 
Takakuwa Takuo, who succeeded him as commander of the Sandakan Camp, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. It seems illogical that the trial of 
Takakuwa would be heard first, when the atrocities of which Hoshijima was 
accused occurred before Takakuwa had assumed command. One possible 
explanation is that the Takakuwa trial was heard first so that that the court 
would have judicial notice that the prisoners were unhealthy before 
Takakuwa took command; that is, that Hoshijima was responsible for the 
condition the POWs were in, and so was partially responsible for the large 
number of deaths which occurred during the march. Though the prosecutor 
did link Hoshijima to Takakuwa, arguing that he had some responsibility for 
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the deaths, this argument was never a significant part of the trial, and appears 
to have been set aside.  
Hoshijima was originally assigned to the Sandakan region as 
commander of an engineer company, to construct the airfield. The prisoners 
initially reported relatively good conditions at the camp.
2
 They were paid for 
their work on the airstrip, which enabled them to trade with locals for extra 
food rations. A canteen was also built at the camp, where extra food, 
medicine, and luxuries such as cigarettes could be bought. Discipline was 
also relatively light, with minimal beatings. In 1943, conditions at the camp 
declined.
3
 Prisoners’ memoirs and works by historians offer a number of 
explanations. In mid-1943, all but eight officers had been taken from the 
camp and moved to Kuching, approximately 900 kilometres west of 
Sandakan.
4
 Officers provided some, albeit limited, protection from Japanese 
mistreatment, by complaining formally to their captors, as well as organising 
the soldiers to support each other, so their removal was thought to have had a 
deleterious effect. In the prisoners’ view, increased brutality could also be 
attributed to the arrival of Formosan guards: many POW memoirs claim that 
Formosan guards were more likely to beat and torture POWs, allegedly 
because of their low position, as colonial subjects, in the Japanese military 
hierarchy. As a way of compensating for their inferiority, they treated the 
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prisoners as inferior to themselves, or so the prisoners believed.
5
 Finally, by 
1943, the Japanese military position in the Pacific had been seriously 
undermined by Allied advances and by an extremely effective Allied 
submarine campaign, which severely restricted resupply from the sea. Lack 
of supply restricted the amount of food and medicine that reached islands 
occupied by Japanese troops. Further, the prisoners believed that their guards 
were frustrated at the defeats sustained by Japanese forces across the Pacific, 
and took out their frustration on the prisoners. Sandakan Camp was not the 
only one in which conditions deteriorated in 1943: POWs at Ambon 
experienced a similar worsening of conditions at around the same time.
6
 
The use of cages as punishment was the main focus of the first charge, 
that is, that Hoshijima had authorised and permitted the confinement of 
prisoners under inhuman conditions, and had authorised his subordinates to 
beat them. Three bamboo cages had been built in early 1943, to be used in the 
punishment of both POWs and IJA soldiers who broke camp regulations. The 
cages were designed so that a person inside could not lie down or properly 
stand up. These cages were not unique to Sandakan; records show they were 
relatively widespread in POW camps across Asia and the Pacific.
7
 Testimony 
from surviving POWs stated that when put into one of the cages they were 
not fed for the first week, were denied water for several days, and were taken 
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out for regular beatings by IJA guards. In the cage they had no protection 
from the elements, or from mosquitoes carrying malaria. One POW died 
while in the cage at Sandakan, while several became severely sick, and died 
after being released from the cage. Hoshijima admitted to ordering POWs 
into the cage. He also stated that the cage may have been used without his 
express authority. In cross-examining Hoshijima, the prosecutor established 
that he had inspected the cages on several occasions, and so was aware of 
what they were like.
8
  
Hoshijima’s defence to the charge was based on the assertion that this 
form of punishment was widespread in the Japanese army, and that under IJA 
disciplinary regulations, he was entitled to order those under his command to 
be put in the cage. He denied any knowledge that prisoners were allowed no 
food or water for prolonged periods while in the cage. He attributed the 
deaths which occurred from mistreatment in the cages to sudden attacks of 
malaria.
9
 Hoshijima’s defence to this charge was not a total defence. He 
admitted that prisoners were put in the cages, an act which, by itself, is 
considered as mistreatment of POWs, for which he could be held responsible 
on the principle of command responsibility. Hoshijima’s defence was thus 
limited because he denied only the beatings carried out by his subordinates 
during a prisoner’s punishment in the cage, and the withholding of food and 
water. 
Although the prosecutor had established a basic framework for a 
command responsibility argument for this charge, the argument was not fully 
raised during the trial. The prosecutor showed that the cages were in plain 
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sight, that they were commonly used in punishing the prisoners, and that 
Hoshijima had inspected them. Combining these three elements, it is probable 
that the prosecutor could successfully have argued that Hoshijima knew, or 
ought to have known, that POWs were placed in the cages, even if it had been 
done without his actual authority, and were beaten. The most likely reason 
that this argument was not pursued is that Hoshijima admitted to ordering 
POWs into the cage himself. As such, there was no substantial need for the 
prosecutor to argue that he was liable for the conduct of his troops, or that he 
had failed to discharge his duty. He had clearly ordered the ill-treatment. 
The second charge, that Hoshijima authorised and permitted the 
torture and beating of prisoners, relied on evidence by former POWs that 
beatings occurred while they were working on the airstrip. The prosecution 
clearly thought there was a difference between the beatings that took place in 
the cage, and those that took place outside of it. This difference, though 
minimal, may have been exploited to increase the number of charges against 
Hoshijima. Allegedly, POWs were beaten by their guards for not working fast 
enough. The prosecution raised evidence that on at least two occasions, 
prisoners were tied to logs and beaten over several days.
10
 In cross-
examination, Hoshijima initially denied that beatings were widespread, yet 
when numerous instances were raised by the prosecutor, he admitted that they 
had happened. Hoshijima also admitted that he himself had slapped POWs on 
several occasions. A common defence at trials of Japanese soldiers accused 
of beating prisoners was that the beatings were merely light slaps, and that 
punishment such as this was accepted in the Japanese military. He originally 
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maintained that they were light slaps, but when the amount of evidence 
showed that they were heavy punches, one of which took out a prisoner’s eye, 
Hoshijima blamed other guards.
11
 After Hoshijima admitted that he had seen 
beatings, and had taken part in them himself, there could be no substantial 
defence to the charge. He argued that beatings had been used as a last resort, 
and that they were a widespread form of punishment within the IJA. 
However, as noted by the prosecuting officer, the court was operating under 
international criminal law, which meant that defences specific to Japanese 
military law were not applicable.
12
 
The third charge was the major focus of the trial, that is, the alleged 
failure to provide adequate food and medical care for the POWs. The 
prosecution alleged that Hoshijima, upon receiving rations for the prisoners 
and for his subordinates from the local IJA quartermaster, failed to give the 
prisoners all of their rations, instead keeping some for his own soldiers. The 
prosecutor also alleged that substantial medical supplies had been available to 
Hoshijima, but that again, he had not provided adequately for the prisoners’ 
needs, instead stockpiling medical supplies for his own soldiers.
13
 
Claims that prisoners had been denied adequate food and medicine 
were common in the trials of suspected Japanese war criminals. In response, 
defendants and their lawyers often asserted that supplies were limited for 
everyone, and that it was impossible to obtain enough. In this case, however, 
the prosecution claimed that there were adequate supplies, but that they had 
been kept from the prisoners. The evidence raised by the prosecutor had been 
provided by the former POW William Sticpewich, mentioned in the previous 
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chapter. Sticpewich played a major role at the Sandakan-Ranau trials. The 
Australian military believed him to be very reliable, and he supplied 
evidence, either in person or on paper, at all of the Sandakan-Ranau trials. He 
also gave evidence, in person, at the IMTFE.
14
 At the Hoshijima trial, 
Sticpewich, appearing in person, stated that he saw large quantities of rice, 
the main food source for the prisoners, stored under Hoshijima’s house in 
1944, at a time when the rice ration for POWs had been cut in half at 
Sandakan. Sticpewich asserted that the guards were eating considerably more 
than the prisoners at this stage. He claimed that the deathrate of POWs in late 
1944 and early 1945 was approximately ten or twelve men per day, mostly 
from starvation and disease.
15
 Evidence from an IJA supply officer, 
independent of the POW camp, stated that though rations for all prisoners had 
been cut in 1944, the allotted amount was still higher than what was being 
given to prisoners at Sandakan.
16
  Affidavits from guards, mostly Formosans, 




The prosecution again relied on Sticpewich’s evidence to show a 
failure to provide medical care. Sticpewich testified that he saw numerous 
boxes of Red Cross medical supplies in an IJA storeroom. He asserted that 
POWs would often trade items, such as watches and clothing, with individual 
IJA soldiers for quinine, thus proving that some additional medicine was 
available.
18
 A local doctor, who had lived in Sandakan since? before the war 
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started, stated in an affidavit that in 1943 there had been enough quinine at 
Sandakan to supply all of Borneo for two years.
19
 A report from a British 
soldier, written in October 1945, corroborated this information. The soldier 
stated that approximately fifty kilograms of quinine, along with considerable 
amounts of vitamins and ulcer treatments, were found at Sandakan after the 
Allied invasion of Borneo.
20
 
In his defence, Hoshijima stated that on several occasions he had 
obtained extra meat for the POWs from nearby farms. He had also allowed 
prisoners to go fishing. He claimed that he had petitioned his superiors for 
more food for the prisoners, and had argued that cuts to rations would be 
disastrous to their health. He further claimed that he had inflated the number 
of POWs at Sandakan in his official reports, so as to get more rations. He 
denied that the IJA guards had received more food than the POWs, and that 
the stores of food under his house were supposed to be for the POWs.
21
 
Hoshijima’s defence in relation to the medical supplies was very similar. He 
testified that he had attempted to obtain extra medicines for the POWs from a 
nearby hospital on multiple occasions, and had also sent an officer to 
Kuching to request more. He denied that the Red Cross parcels seen by 
Sticpewich had been held back for the IJA, and claimed that they had in fact 
been distributed to the POWs.
22
  
Hoshijima may indeed have obtained extra supplies on occasion. His 
defence, however, that he did make adequate efforts to supply the prisoners 
with food and medicine, is largely undone by the high deathrate amongst the 
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POWs in late 1944 and early 1945. Only one member of the IJA at Sandakan 
POW Camp died from disease during Hoshijima’s time as commander. 
Hoshijima attempted to explain the discrepancy by arguing that the POWs 
were not acclimatised to the tropics, and that the Japanese and Formosan 
soldiers were.
23
 Article Nine of the 1929 Geneva Convention stipulated that 
prisoners from temperate climates were not to be held in tropical locations for 
longer than necessary.
24
 It appears that Hoshijima used this clause in the 
Convention to blame the Japanese government for the deaths.   
The charge of failing to supply adequate food and medicine was thus 
substantiated by the high deathrate of the POWs, together with the testimony 
of Sticpewich and IJA supply personnel. The prosecutor relied on this 
combination of evidence to highlight the discrepancy in access to necessary 
items between the POWs and the guards. As with the first two charges, 
Hoshijima raised no substantial defence to the charge that could adequately 
explain the crimes alleged by the prosecution.  
The final charge, that Hoshijima authorised and permitted sick and 
underfed POWs in his charge to be used for heavy manual labour, was a 
minor point in the trial. The reason is that evidence raised in relation to the 
third charge, in which the prosecutor alleged that the majority of POWs were 
sick and underfed in late 1944, essentially established the major element of 
the fourth charge as well. The defence did not contest the claim that work on 
the airstrip was under way at the relevant time. Since the court had accepted 
the evidence of the third charge, the basic elements of the fourth charge had 
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been met: the prisoners were sick, and were working on the airstrip. 
Hoshijima’s defence to the final charge was that the sick prisoners who had 
been forced to work at manual labour had been ordered to do so by one of his 
subordinates, Lieutenant Moritake. Hoshijima claimed that he had 
reprimanded Moritake for forcing the sick to work.
25
 However, it is unlikely 
that this single reprimand could fully have discharged Hoshijima’s duty to 
ensure that sick prisoners were not used for heavy labour, because the charge 
covered a considerable period of time, namely the last half of 1944.   
In his closing address the prosecutor declared that Hoshijima was 
directly responsible for the deaths of 1100 POWs at Sandakan. According to 
the prosecutor, these deaths were almost entirely attributable to Hoshijima’s 
refusal – rather than inability – to properly supply the POWs with adequate 
food or medicine. The prosecutor presented limited arguments that Hoshijima 
was responsible for the acts of his subordinates, or that he had failed to 
discharge his duty in controlling his subordinates. Instead, he relied heavily 
on the weight of evidence showing widespread brutality and neglect that had 
been directly perpetrated by Hoshijima. 
Hoshijima’s trial is unusual in comparison with the other officer trials 
that emerged from the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, principally because of the 
ample amount of evidence available to the prosecutor. Rather than needing to 
rely on limited witness statements, the prosecutor was presented with many 
details of the crimes committed during the period in question, both from 
guards, and from former POWs who had at some point been moved to 
Kuching, and had therefore survived the Sandakan Camp. Hoshijima also 
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implicated himself in most of the charges. As a result, the prosecutor was able 
to show that the guards had often committed crimes against the POWs and 
that the overall commander of the camp not only allowed the crimes to 
happen, but also actively participated. It was not a trial in which the 
prosecutor’s principal task was to hold a commander responsible for the 
actions of his subordinates. Instead, the trial determined that a commanding 
officer was directly responsible for the deaths of 1100 POWs, mostly through 
actions that he himself undertook. Because there were large amounts of 
evidence supporting the prosecution’s case, with limited explanation or 
defences by the accused, the prosecutor did not need to argue fully that 
command responsibility was at issue in order to secure a death sentence. The 
fact that a command responsibility argument was included in one of the 
charges shows that it was seen as a potentially useful legal tool to convict 
Hoshijima. However, it is likely that the relative novelty of the doctrine of 




THE TRIAL FOR THE FIRST MARCH 
 
Atrocities connected with the first march from Sandakan to Ranau were the 
subject of two trials. Between 23 and 28 January 1946, the joint trial of 
Captain Yamamoto Shoichi, Captain Iino Shigeru, Captain Abe Kazuo, 
Captain Mizuta Ryuichi, Lieutenant Sugimura Shimichi, Lieutenant Hirano 
Yihikiko, Lieutenant Horikawa Koichi, Lieutenant Sato Tatsuo, Lieutenant 
Tanaka Shojiro, Warrant Officer Gotanda Kiroku, and Sergeant Sato Shinichi 
took place at Labuan. All eleven of the accused were charged with the murder 
of numerous POWs in their charge, or alternatively, with the ill-treatment of 
numerous POWs, by compelling them to march long distances under difficult 
conditions when sick and underfed. The alternative charge of ill-treatment, 
which also established a responsibility of the accused for deaths of the POWs, 
was a way to ensure that the accused could be convicted by the court, even if 
murderous intent were not found. At the end of the proceedings, under the 
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advice of the JAG, the Confirming Officer rejected the court’s findings. A 
retrial was held at Rabaul, between 20 and 27 May 1946.
1
 
This chapter examines both trials. The doctrine of command 
responsibility was used at both, but the two trials demonstrate different 
interpretations of what defined command, and how command responsibility 
could be attached to these different definitions of command. In the first trial, 
command responsibility was attached to all of the officers, as the court 
determined that in the circumstance in question, they had operated not as 
junior officers, but as junior commanders. In the retrial, the court held that the 
military experience of an accused was a factor in applying responsibility, and 
therefore, in its judgment, the court differentiated among the accused. The 
retrial also showed that the defence could successfully argue that acting under 
superior orders diminished the scope and discretion of command which could 
be attached to an officer.  
  In January 1945, Captain Yamamoto had received orders from 
Lieutenant-General Baba Masao’s headquarters to move 500 prisoners from 
Sandakan POW Camp to Ranau. Captain Yamamoto and Captain Hoshijima 
decided that there were not 500 POWs of good enough health to complete the 
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march, and in the end, approximately 450 prisoners were taken from 
Sandakan Camp. The prisoners were organised into groups of fifty, each led 
by one of the accused officers. As we will see, this division of prisoners into 
groups led by one officer had important ramifications for the accused in the 
two trials. Neither of the two NCOs charged in the two trials was in control of 
a group.  
  Approximately 250 of the 450 prisoners died on the march to Ranau, 
from  starvation, disease, exhaustion, and execution by IJA soldiers. Captain 
Abe commanded the rear group. Before the march began he was ordered by 
Captain Yamamoto, on Yamamoto’s admission, to kill any POWS or guards 
who were too sick or weak to continue. As in the case of Captain Takakuwa, 
discussed in the first chapter, Captain Yamamoto claimed that he had ordered 
the executions so that food and medicine would not be wasted on those who 
would likely die, and also as an act of humanity, so that the sick would not 
die slowly from starvation or exposure.
2
  
  At the first trial, all of the accused were found guilty of one of the 
two charges. Yamamoto, Abe, Gotanda and Sato were found guilty of 
murder. Yamamoto was sentenced to be hanged, while the others were 
sentenced to death by firing squad. Tanaka, who was second in command of 
his group at the time, but was the only member of that group to be indicted, 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for ill-treatment of POWs. The remaining 
officers were all found guilty of ill-treating POWs, and were sentenced to 
death by firing squad.
3
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  Yamamoto’s admission that he had ordered Abe to kill POWs who 
were too sick to continue the march would have been enough to secure his 
conviction, and thereafter, the prosecutor ceased to focus on Yamamoto’s 
actions. The prosecutor did, however, devote considerable attention to the 
exact wording of Yamamoto’s directions to Abe. The question was whether 
Yamamoto had directly ordered Abe to shoot the prisoners, or had merely 
given him what the prosecution labelled a “licence to kill”.
4
 The difference 
between the two could have determined whether Abe, in executing the POWs 
who fell behind, had followed orders, or exercised his own discretion. As will 
be shown, however, other factors were more influential in Abe’s sentencing 
  Both Yamamoto and Abe argued that Yamamoto’s direction to Abe 
constituted an order. If the court accepted this point, Abe ought to have been 
held to a lesser level of responsibility. At the time the order was issued, 
however, Abe was not actually under Yamamoto’s command. Abe was the 
commander of an independent unit, which was placed under the command of 
Yamamoto once the march began.
5
 This situation demonstrates the difficulty 
in assigning responsibility in complex or unfamiliar command structures. 
Because Abe was not under Yamamoto’s command at the relevant time, the 
order given to Abe could be interpreted as not binding. The fact that the court 
found Abe guilty of murder suggests that he was held to have had some level 
of discretion in choosing whether to follow the order. The charge of 
command responsibility requires the capacity to exercise discretion, which is 
the hallmark of command: if an officer is entitled to take action under his 
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own initiative, he is a commander.
6
 A significant challenge not only at 
national war crimes trials, but also at the IMTFE, was understanding how 
command worked in the Japanese military, where actual command was often 
overlapping, or unorganised and unclear.
7
 
In the first trial, the junior officers who were sentenced to death were 
found guilty of ill-treatment of POWs. The prosecutor maintained that the 
march was a deliberate act, designed by the accused to kill the prisoners. He 
argued that the junior officers showed implied malice in forcing the POWs to 
march when they were so unhealthy, and that the fact that they did not allow 
for adequate rest indicated a murderous intent.
8
 It is surprising that although 
the court did not find the junior officers guilty of murder, it did find that the 
ill-treatment inflicted on the POWs was severe enough to warrant the death 
penalty. On this point, the division of the prisoners into groups under separate 
commanders appears to have been crucial. The reasoning seems to have been 
that the accused officers had been in limited contact with Yamamoto, the 
overall commander, and that as commanders of their own groups, they had 
some discretion in the amount of time taken to finish the march.
9
 This aspect 
of the sentencing shows that in this trial, the court found that a duty of 
command operated at multiple levels within a relatively small structure. The 
court probably considered that because the sub-commanders had been 
separated from their direct commander, in practice they had operated as 
distinct superior officers. 
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  The defence of superior orders was claimed by all of the accused in 
this trial, to argue that they were not responsible for their actions. The 
rationale behind the defence of superior orders is that organised militaries 
rely on obedience to superior orders, and that junior officers and enlisted 
personnel often do not have the training to know whether an order would lead 
to a breach of international criminal law and therefore ought to be refused or 
ignored. There is a logical link between command responsibility and superior 
orders. In both cases, the superior officer is alleged to be responsible for the 
actions of his subordinates.
10
 At the start of the Second World War, the 
majority of Allied military manuals, including Australia’s, stated that the 
defence of superior orders was a total defence to a charge. This meant that if 
it were shown that a subordinate had committed a war crime under the orders 
of a superior officer, he could not be found guilty of the crime. Military 
regulations were changed when it became clear that Allied governments 
would pursue alleged war criminals, most of whom were likely to claim that 
they had acted under the orders of a superior officer. At the end of the 
conflict, the majority of accused Japanese war criminals still maintained, in 
effect, that obedience to superior orders was a total defence to the charge.
11
 
Like the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Allied war crimes courts, 
including Australia’s, took the view that superior orders were not a total 
defence to the charge, but might function as a mitigating factor at the time of 
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 In the Labuan trial, the defence of superior orders was clearly 
rejected by the court for those who had led a group during the march, 
probably because the court decided they held some level of discretionary 
command, and that superior orders were therefore not a legitimate defence to 
the charge of ill-treatment. 
  Warrant Officer Gotanda and Sergeant Sato were both found guilty 
of murder in the first trial. Through an affidavit, Private Keith Botterill of the 
Australian army accused Gotanda of directly shooting a POW, based on 
hearsay evidence. Though it was accepted at the Labuan trial, the reliability 
of Botterill’s evidence was questioned later, at the Rabaul trial. Evidence 
against Sato was derived from an interrogation of an IJA private, who stated 
that Sato had ordered the execution of two POWs.
13
 This evidence appears 
reliable, as the private was allegedly present at the time. The conviction of the 
two NCOs for murder suggests that the mitigating impact of superior orders 
was limited. 
  Lieutenant Tanaka, who was second in command of his group during 
the march, was sentenced to life in prison. Tanaka’s presence at the trial was 
unusual, as no other officer at the trial had been second in command during 
the march. The officer in charge of Tanaka’s group had died before the trial 
began, and Tanaka appears to have been brought before the court as the most 
senior available representative of his group.
14
 The fact that he received a 
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lighter sentence than the other accused is probably because he had no 
substantial degree of command or control over his men: he had operated 
under the orders of both Yamamoto and his own immediate superior officer, 
now deceased. 
  The sentencing in the first trial was heavily criticised in the JAG’s 
report to the Confirming Officer. The JAG stated that the junior officers, who 
were found guilty of ill-treating the POWs by forcing them to march, were 
not in a position to disobey the orders they had received, not only because of 
their junior position, but also because once the march was under way, they 
had no option but to continue to their destination. Supplies had been left for 
them along the route, and had they turned around, no fresh supplies would 
have been available to them. The JAG thus stated that there was insufficient 
evidence to find the junior officers guilty of the charge.
15
 In reaching this 
assessment, the JAG appears to have considered superior orders as a 
complete defence. The evidence did show that the junior officers had forced 
the prisoners to march, and under the circumstances, this amounted to ill-
treatment. The JAG nevertheless found that there was insufficient evidence to 
convict them. According to the JAG, the real criminals were those 
responsible for ordering the march. In this assessment, the JAG put command 
responsibility at the centre of the trial. His opinion was that the commanders 
were responsible, and that superior orders ought to excuse subordinates of 
culpability for their crimes.
16
  
  It is not entirely clear why a retrial was ordered. The Confirming 
Officer, in reviewing the decision of the first trial, failed to approve either the 
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verdicts of guilt or the sentencing. A staff officer stated that the retrial was 
necessary so that evidence could be given directly by three prosecution 
witnesses, Botterill, Moxham and Sticpewich, rather than the court relying on 
affidavits. Previous trials which had relied on affidavit evidence, however, 
had been confirmed. It is possible that the retrial was ordered to address the 
issues with both the verdicts and sentencing that were discussed in the JAG’s 
report, though the question of why the Confirming Officer did not merely 
adjust the decision as he saw fit still remains.
17
  
  The major changes at the second trial concerned the sentencing of the 
junior officers, and the verdicts brought in against the NCOs. For Yamamoto 
and Abe, the senior officers, the finding of the court remained the same. The 
junior officers were again all found guilty of ill-treatment, but they were 
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. This was a drastic reduction of their 
previous penalties: all except one had been sentenced to death, and the 
exception was a life sentence. The change was even more dramatic for the 
two NCOs, who were both found not guilty on both charges.
18
 In the case of 
Gotanda, the reason is probably that the evidence of Botterill, now given in 
person, was deemed unreliable. Sergeant Sato was probably found not guilty 
merely by reason of his rank.  
  In its opening address, the prosecution again argued that although 
forcing the POWs to march might appear to constitute ill-treatment, it was, 
rather, a method of murdering the POWs. The charge of murder thus covered 
not only the POWs who were directly executed during the march, but also 
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those who died through exhaustion, starvation, and disease.
19
 As in the 
original trial, the defence’s response was that all of the accused were acting 
under superior orders. Yamamoto relied on the orders that he had received 
from Lieutenant-General Baba Masao to undertake the march. Yamamoto 
also alleged, for the first time, that he had been ordered to undertake the 
march as quickly as possible. All of the other accused officers were said to 
have acted under Yamamoto’s orders.
20
 They further testified that they had 
been ordered to complete the march quickly.  
  Yamamoto’s claim of superior orders was rejected by the court, 
probably for two reasons. First, he had directly ordered his subordinates to 
execute the prisoners who could not continue.
21
 As noted above, this by itself 
would have satisfied a court that Yamamoto was directly responsible for the 
deaths of those prisoners. Second, the court probably found that Yamamoto 
set the timetable for the march himself, and that he had not in fact been 
instructed in the original orders to complete it as quickly as possible. A strict 
timetable had not been mentioned in the quashed trial. If a timetable had been 
included in the orders, it is highly unlikely that the defence would have 
passed over that point. At the second trial, the officers all testified that the 
order had existed. When asked why it had not been mentioned at the first 
trial, they replied that they had not been directly asked about it. The fact that 
such an important piece of evidence was not produced at the first trial, 
together with the organised manner in which it was raised at the retrial, 
suggests that it was most likely a fabrication.
22
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  The verdict brought in against Abe was very likely based on the 
same reasoning as in the original trial. Though Abe had not directly 
participated in the executions, he had ensured that the orders given to him by 
Yamamoto were carried out by his subordinates.
23
 The fact that he had been 
relatively independent of Yamamoto at the time the order was given, and that 
Abe nevertheless made sure that the POWs were executed, probably 
convinced the court that he had had some degree of discretion in carrying out 
his duty.  
  The JA (who was not the same as the one at the Labuan trial) played 
an active role in the retrial. At the conclusion of the proceedings, he 
explained to the court that where an act by omission or commission is lawful, 
yet at the same time dangerous, and is carried out in gross negligence, the 
resulting death should be classed as manslaughter at the very least. In his 
report to the JAG, the JA submitted that the junior officers, by reason of their 
isolation from their immediate superiors, could reasonably have been 
required to exercise a degree of command. Though it is not explicitly stated, 
it is likely that the JA meant that the junior officers should have changed the 
pace of the march, and taken greater care of straggling POWs. The JA went 
on to state that the junior officers had failed to alleviate the suffering of the 
prisoners under their charge, because they failed to exercise discretion in their 
command. As a result of this failure to act, a large number of POWs died. 
The JA apparently believed the junior officers were guilty of manslaughter at 
least, because they failed to exercise discretion in their command groups. 
This argument frames a charge of murder as a charge of homicide;  murder 
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and manslaughter are degrees of homicide. Evidently the JA agreed with the 
prosecutor’s argument that the deaths that occurred on the march outside of 
direct execution were still homicidal.
24
  
  This argument was clearly rejected by the court, as the junior officers 
were found not guilty of murder, but instead, of ill-treatment of prisoners. 
The argument made by the JA in this regard appears sound, but it is likely 
that the court was heavily influenced in the opposite direction by the junior 
officers’ claim of superior orders. As stated earlier, under the accepted 
interpretation of this claim, the court would still be required to find the 
officers guilty of murder, and could then mitigate their sentences after 
reaching this verdict. Rather, it would appear that the court used the defence 
of superior orders to downgrade the officers’ responsibility for the deaths of 
POWs under their command, and instead to find them guilty of ill-treatment.  
  All of the accused were questioned directly by the members of the 
bench, on matters which appeared to have had a direct bearing on the court’s 
decisions. The accused were asked about their level of field experience and 
formal training at the time of the march, and what their rank was at that time. 
Yamamoto, Abe and Iino had all been on active service since at least 1942. 
Iino had been Yamamoto’s adjutant. All of the other officers had been 
members of the reserve army, and were not placed on active service until 
September 1944. None of the accused had undergone training at a military 
school.
25
 The fact that the junior officers had only very recently been placed 
on active service was probably a major factor in mitigating their culpability. 
Iino’s position as adjutant, meaning that he was an administrative officer, 
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likely played a similar part in mitigating his culpability, but as was common 




  The reliability of one of the witnesses also appears to have been a 
key factor in the court’s judgment. Private Keith Botterill, one of the 
surviving POWs from the march, presented evidence of dubious quality. 
Reports by the Australian military state that Botterill had also given 
unreliable evidence on other occasions.
27
 Lynette Ramsay Silver, who wrote 
on the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, conducted interviews with Botterill in 
1997, in which he expressed remorse for giving false evidence in court to 
secure convictions.
28
 At the Rabaul trial he repeated in person evidence that 
he had given in affidavit at the Labuan trial, alleging  that Gotanda had 
executed an Australian POW who had fallen behind. This claim was based on 
hearsay from a POW who later died on the march. That the evidence was 
hearsay was not in itself an issue: Sticpewich, who was not on the march, 
gave a considerable amount of evidence that was deemed reliable at this trial. 
Rather, Botterill gave conflicting evidence about Gotanda’s personality and 
behaviour. He alleged that Gotanda was capable of killing a sick POW, yet 
also stated that he had refused to do so on a separate occasion, instead asking 
an Australian prisoner to carry out the shooting. Botterill also stated that the 
IJA members in his group received three times as much food as the POWs, 
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yet also stated that Gotanda had bought meat from locals and evenly shared it 
amongst the prisoners and guards.
29
 These contradictions probably brought 
Botterill’s statements into disrepute, and the evidence he gave pertaining to 
specific IJA members appears to have been largely disregarded by the court.  
  In Sergeant Sato’s case, the issue was probably rank, rather than 
what he had actually done. The prosecutor’s opening address explicitly 
accused him of shooting POWs.
30
 According to the defence, the interrogation 
upon which this accusation was based was subject to an error. The defence 
contended that during the march there were multiple guards named Sato (and 
indeed, two defendants in this trial were named Sato), and that it was in fact a 
deceased Sato of different rank who had ordered the executions. At trials of 
Japanese war criminals deceased soldiers were often blamed for the 
commission or ordering of war crimes, but it seems unlikely that two ranks 
would be confused. The fact that the court found Sato not guilty on all counts 
might theoretically show that it had accepted this defence. However, it is 
more probable that the court found Sato not guilty by reason of his rank. It is 
unlikely to be a coincidence that the two NCOs, Sato and Gotanda, were both 
found not guilty, where there was credible evidence against them. Instead it 
seems that the court followed a pattern identified by Australian prosecutor 
Athol Moffit, who noted in his diary that the policy of the court at the time of 
the Labuan trials was to “shoot the person in charge, and … let the privates 
and sergeants go with imprisonment”.
31
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  Command responsibility at the second trial was not a contentious 
issue in relation to the senior officers: it was clear that Yamamoto and Abe 
had directly ordered the execution of straggling POWs. The distinguishing 
feature of the second trial is the rejection by the court of the argument from 
both the prosecutor and the JA that the junior officers had a duty to exercise 
some degree of discretion by reason of their separation from their own 
commander, and that therefore, they ought to be convicted of murder. The 
sentences of the junior officers were apparently reduced because of their lack 
of military experience and the fact that they had operated under superior 
orders. Though they had exercised a degree of command, and thus were 
responsible to some extent for the deaths of a large number of prisoners, the 
court found that them not guilty of murder. Just as the JAG had asserted in 
the report on the original trial, the second court concluded that the junior 
officers had not been in a position to avoid the actions they took. This 
assessment recognised that the largely unqualified responsibility assigned to 
the junior officers in the first trial did not reflect their actual position in the 
chain of command. In turn, this acknowledgment of the realities of command 
demonstrates that the prosecutor’s interpretation of command responsibility 
did not always align with that of the court, and that, at least on this occasion, 
steps were taken to ensure that the doctrine was properly used to convict 









THE TRIAL OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BABA MASAO 
 
Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was the highest ranking member of the IJA 
who was tried for his part in the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities by the Australian 
military.
1
 Baba was charged with “unlawfully disregarding and failing to 
discharge his duty to control the conduct of the members of his command, 
whereby they committed brutal atrocities and other high crimes, against the 
people of the Commonwealth of Australia, and its Allies, between December 
1944 and September 1945”. This charge covered the crimes committed by 
members of his command during the first and second marches to Ranau, and 
the massacre of POWs at Ranau in August 1945. The trial took place at 
Rabaul, between 28 May and 2 June 1947. Baba was found guilty of the 
charge, and was executed by hanging on 7 August.
2
  
  The crime for which Baba was charged was framed as a separate 
offence as a superior officer: that is, his crime was distinct from that of his 
subordinates. The court found that he had the requisite level of knowledge to 
have taken action to prevent, halt, or punish the commission of war crimes by 
his subordinates. Because of this knowledge, he had a very broad and far 
reaching responsibility, which he failed to discharge adequately. At certain 
points in the trial, the prosecution also presented arguments that were more 
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aligned with holding Baba strictly liable for the crimes of his subordinates. 
Thus, in Baba’s case, a dual interpretation of the principle of command 
responsibility was evident at the one trial. 
  Baba’s was one of five senior officer trials held at Rabaul where 
command responsibility was explicitly used.
3
 The Rabaul senior officer trials 
were heard before a bench of a largely stable composition, with minimal 
changes in personnel between trials.  At three of the trials before Baba’s, 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Brock had assisted the bench as JA. Brock had 
carefully studied the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Yamashita appeal, and had advised the court against finding a broad and 
unqualified responsibility when applying the doctrine of command 
responsibility. Though Brock was not present at Baba’s trial, the fact that the 
majority of the members of the bench had previously heard his interpretation 
of the doctrine meant that command responsibility was relatively consistently 
applied across the senior officer trials.
4
 The already controversial decision of 
the military tribunal that tried Yamashita would have been fresh in the minds 
of those conducting the Rabual trials. It is likely that prosecutors wanted to 
show that a more traditional legal method was in use at the senior command 
responsibility trials, as an important part of establishing the proceedings as 
fair. 
  The charge against Baba was very broad. Originally the prosecution 
had intended that he should face three, more specific charges. The first two 
charges, one relating to the first and one to the second march, were that he 
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had ordered the POWs moved from Sandakan to Ranau, when they were in 
such a condition that it would cause them great pain and suffering. The third 
original charge was that he had violated the laws and usages of war, by 
unlawfully disregarding, and failing to discharge, his duty to control the 
members of his command. This charge addressed the massacre of thirty-three 
POWs under Takakuwa’s orders, on or around 1 August 1945.
5
 Though the 
original charges were amalgamated into one broad charge, the prosecutors 
still presented their case as though they were accusing Baba of the original 
three charges. This procedure had no material effect on the evidence raised 
during the trial. The charges were probably redrafted to make one broad 
charge in order to favour the prosecution: rather than having explicitly to 
show Baba’s guilt in relation to each specific charge, it was only necessary to 
show that atrocities had been committed by members of his command, and 
that he had failed in his duty to command or control. Using such a broad 
charge was not unusual in senior officer command responsibility cases.
6
 In 
fact, Brock had previously criticised this kind of charge as having no real 
meaning under international criminal law, because it was too general.
7
 
  The prosecutor drew direct attention to the Yamashita case in his 
opening address, pointing out that the phrase “brutal high crimes and other 
atrocities” had also been used in the charge against Yamashita. He went on to 
state that the charge had been upheld as valid by the US Supreme Court. This 
explanation was no doubt intended to address Brock’s comments in previous 
trials that the charge had a limited basis in international law.
8
 Furthermore, 
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using the doctrine of command responsibility in war crimes courts was still a 
novel practice. Making explicit reference to the Yamashita trial was probably 
meant to reinforce the validity of the trial, by appealing to precedent in a 
manner similar to the practice in civilian courts.  
  Formal command responsibility was more important in Baba’s trial 
than in the previous Sandakan-Ranau trials. In all the previous proceedings, 
command responsibility had been used to varying extents to hold the accused 
responsible for the actions of their subordinates. In those cases, there had 
been a reasonably clear and direct connection between the crimes committed 
and the superior officers, who had been in close proximity to the crime. 
Though they may not have personally participated in the crime, they had had 
direct and immediate control over their subordinates. Baba, by contrast, had 
remained at his headquarters, relying on staff officers to transmit his orders. 
He was thus clearly separated from the subordinate personnel accused of 
committing war crimes.  
  Compared with previous trials of officers accused of responsibility 
for the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, the court in Baba’s case took a more rigid 
and formulaic approach to procedure, probably because of the importance of 
the case: Baba was a very senior officer, who had commanded the troops 
responsible for a major atrocity against Australian soldiers, and his trial 
would therefore attract significant attention in Australia. Moreover, the trial 
took place more than a year after the other proceedings, so courtroom 
practices had probably developed to conform more with civilian trial 
procedure. The prosecutor, for example, took the trouble to highlight the 




committed on Australian territory, had been committed against soldiers of the 
Australian military and their Allies, and had been committed by an enemy 
nation’s soldiers.
9
 At no other Sandakan-Ranau trial had this been done.  
  Initially it seemed there was little evidence connecting Baba to the 
decision to undertake the first march to Ranau. The prosecutor acknowledged 
that although the march took place under Baba’s command, he could not 
prove that Baba had created the order for the march. He also acknowledged 
that the idea behind the march had likely been originated by Baba’s 
predecessor. The prosecutor nevertheless argued that there was no real doubt 
that Baba had issued the order for the march, and had decreed that the march 
should be completed as quickly as possible.
10
 The prosecutor thus sought to 
establish the point that, although the idea to move the prisoners from 
Sandakan to Ranau originated with his predecessor, Baba had actually 
ordered that the march take place.  
  The prosecutor maintained that Baba knew, or ought to have known, 
that the POWs were in poor health when he arrived in Borneo.
11
 Baba had 
been de jure commander of Borneo since December 1944, but had not 
actually arrived until January 1945. De facto control of a unit is a required 
element of a command responsibility charge: if the commander does not have 
actual power to command a unit, then logically he cannot be held responsible 
for failing in his duty to control that unit.
12
 To establish that Baba knew of the 
prisoners’ condition, the prosecutor relied on an interrogation of Captain 
Hoshijima, which had been used at Hoshijima’s own trial. The interrogation 
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showed that in October 1944, Hoshijima had allegedly informed “Army 
Headquarters” that the prisoners were in a very poor state of health.
13
 It is 
unclear who “Army Headquarters” was; it could have been Hoshijima’s 
immediate superior, Colonel Suga Tatsuji, or Baba’s predecessor, Lieutenant-
General Yamawaki Masataka.
14
 Regardless of who it was, the contention was 
that Baba ought to have been aware of the prisoners’ condition, even though 
he was not in command at that time. The prosecution maintained that as 
commander, Baba should diligently have informed himself of all the 
circumstances under his command in Borneo. This argument resembles the 
position taken by the prosecution at the Yamashita trial, and is not especially 
controversial. Pappas has shown that it had become established at Australian 
command responsibility trials that a commander could be held guilty for an 
act of either omission or commission.
15
 
  The issue of what Baba knew when he arrived in Borneo continued 
to play a central role in the proceedings. At the end of Baba’s testimony, the 
JA asked him whether, at the time he assumed de facto command in Borneo, 
he had ascertained the condition of the POWs at Sandakan Camp. Baba stated 
that he had, and that he knew what their condition was.
16
 This admission 
clearly showed to the court that Baba had the requisite degree of knowledge 
to be held responsible for the deaths of POWs during the first march. Later, in 
his petition against the verdict of the court, Baba argued that he had 
misinterpreted the JA’s question, treating it instead as an enquiry about 
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whether he had been told that the prisoners were healthy when he took steps 
to ascertain their condition. The report he received, he said, had falsely 
assured him they were healthy.
17
 The difference in interpretation is important: 
Baba argued that in relying on reports given to him, even though they were 
false, he had discharged his duty to ascertain the state of the prisoners’ health, 
and that it was not his fault that his staff officers had given him false 
information. Therefore, he was not responsible for the prisoners’ deaths, as he 
had taken reasonable steps to inform himself of the situation. It seems 
unlikely, however, that Baba had misinterpreted the question, as the JA had 
specifically asked if he knew what the actual condition of the POWs was at 
the time.  
   The prosecution accused Baba of causing unnecessary deaths of 
POWs on the first march, by ordering the march to be completed as quickly 
as possible. As seen in Chapter Three, in the joint trial of Captain Yamamoto 
Shoichi and other officers accused of responsibility for the first march, 
Yamamoto claimed that he had been ordered to complete the march as 
quickly as possible. In that trial, the prosecutor alleged that such an order 
never existed, and that Yamamoto and the other officers were responsible for 
the pace of the march. At Baba’s trial, by contrast, the prosecution essentially 
supported Yamamoto’s claim, arguing that Baba had ordered the march to be 
completed quickly, and as a result, caused the deaths of many POWs, because 
they could not keep up.
18
  
  This reversal by the prosecution across the two trials shows how 
command responsibility was used in the broader context of war crimes trials: 
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as a flexible legal doctrine designed to secure convictions. Further example 
can be seen in the trial of Admiral Toyoda Soemu, who was accused of 
responsibility for crimes committed by Japanese forces during the Battle of 
Manila in 1945. Using the doctrine of command responsibility, the 
prosecution alleged that Toyoda was criminally responsible for the same 
crimes for which General Yamashita had been held responsible two years 
earlier.
19
 Though Toyoda was acquitted, his case shows that the prosecution’s 
reversal of opinion in the Baba trial was not an anomaly.  
  The prosecution argued that Baba had wilfully failed to undertake 
several positive duties when ordering the second march. Therefore, he had 
committed a crime of omission, and he ought to be held responsible for the 
resulting deaths of POWs. The prosecution declared that Baba had had a duty 
to ensure that the prisoners could complete the march without harm. Baba 
neglected this duty, by failing to obtain a full report of the results of the first 
march, wilfully ignoring reports of the POWs’ health, and failing to ensure 
that the prisoners received adequate care at Ranau.
20
 This argument is far 
more detailed than that relating to the first march, which attached 
responsibility to Baba in a much broader sense. Instead of merely asserting 
that Baba knew that the POWs were sick, and nevertheless ordered the 
march, the prosecution argued that he had also failed to take precautions to 
prevent or limit deaths on the march, and afterwards. The bulk of the 
prosecution’s efforts went towards reinforcing this argument. 
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  The case against Baba relied heavily on evidence concerning the 
outcome of the first march to demonstrate that he ought to be held responsible 
for the results of the second, either because of action, or inaction. Yamamoto 
had submitted a written report on the first march. If Baba had wilfully 
ignored it, then he was criminally responsible for failing take necessary steps 
in planning the second march. If, however, Baba had read the report, and had 
ordered the march anyway, than he had committed a crime by commission, as 
he knew that more deaths would occur.
21
 In neither of these arguments would 
Baba have been accused of responsibility for the crimes committed by his 
subordinates; he would be accused of committing a separate offence as a 
superior officer. The fact that the actual crimes occurred was a necessary 
element of the charge, but Baba was not accused of the actual crimes that 
were perpetrated: that is, he was not accused of inflicting bodily harm. 
  Warrant Officer William Sticpewich’s testimony from the trial of 
Takakuwa and Watanabe was used by the prosecution to establish that there 
was inadequate food, medicine and shelter for the POWs, both during the 
march and at Ranau.
22
 Therefore, Baba had failed in his duty to protect the 
POWs from harm during the relevant time. This failure probably suggested 
that Baba was more culpable for the deaths that occurred during the second 
march than during the first, as he had greater control over the planning and 
execution of the second march.   Baba’s defence to the 
accusations about the second march was that he had taken action to ensure the 
prisoners arrived without harm, and that the atrocities which occurred were 
outside of his control. Baba maintained that on 20 May 1945, he had ordered 








his subordinates to move all of the prisoners, but had then sent an immediate 
correction, stipulating that only the healthy be taken. He explained that this 
correction had not reached Takakuwa before he left for Ranau on 28 May. 
The signal post from which the order had been sent to Takakuwa was ten 
miles away.
23
 It is extremely difficult to believe that an order sent by the 
commander of IJA forces in Borneo took more than eight days to reach an 
officer ten miles away. It is more likely that the order was never issued. 
  Baba claimed that he had taken further steps to prepare for the 
second march. He had ordered that the trail be made easier for weakened 
POWs to traverse, and that more food and medicine be supplied. He also 
inquired into the possibility of moving the prisoners on boats, but the 
unrestricted bombing of Japanese vehicles by Allied planes precluded this 
option.
24
 Baba may well have taken these steps. As for the supplies, however, 
the evidence given by Sticpewich during Takakuwa’s trial, and raised again 
as evidence in Baba’s trial, suggested that Takakuwa’s soldiers kept the 
majority for themselves.
25
   
  The fact that Baba was held responsible for the deaths on the second 
march, even though quite possibly he supplied extra food and medicine, 
demonstrates a potential overlap of the two interpretations of command 
responsibility. Baba perhaps took steps to provide the prisoners with food and 
medicine, yet his subordinates committed a war crime by withholding these 
supplies. Since he was held responsible for the deaths which occurred on the 
march from lack of supplies, he was potentially held strictly liable for crimes 
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committed by his subordinates, because of his command position. This 
ambiguity suggests that the two forms of liability encompassed by the 
doctrine – either a separate offence or a strict liability – were not always 
distinct in practice, but could be blended together within one trial. 
  Baba argued that war-time conditions inhibited him from fully 
exercising his command. He stated that the quality of his troops was very 
low; they were not experienced soldiers, but had mostly been drawn from 
reserve forces. Furthermore, the heavy bombing of Borneo by the Allied 
military, beginning in late 1944 and continuing until the end of the war, 
meant that maintaining effective control was difficult.
26
 A similar argument 
had been raised at the Yamashita trial, where the defence maintained that the 
attacking US forces had successfully eliminated Yamashita’s capacity to 
command. This defence had been rejected.
27
 Baba’s similar argument was 
also rejected by the court.  
  Finally, the prosecution argued that the massacre of POWs by 
Takakuwa and his subordinates at Ranau, on or about 1 August 1945, was a 
direct and natural consequence of Baba’s actions or inaction in planning the 
march. The prosecutor stated that Takakuwa had been placed in an 
unfortunate position, and that there was some merit to arguments raised at his 
trial that he had been constrained by military necessity.
28
 The prosecutor thus 
clearly asserted that responsibility for the massacres did not lie solely with 
Takakuwa. Though it is not explicitly stated, the prosecution implied that 
Baba knew, or more likely, ought to have known, that the only option 
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available to Takakuwa would be to execute the remaining prisoners. As 
shown in Chapter Two, it was central to Takakuwa’s conviction that he had 
given the order to execute the POWs at Ranau, and that he had exercised his 
his own discretion in doing so, without superior orders. The fact that the 
prosecutor in the Baba trial sought to apportion the majority of culpability for 
Takakuwa’s actions to Baba shows a strong determination to hold Baba 
responsible for any atrocity with which he could be linked, regardless of how 
limited the connection was. As was done with the alleged timetable for the 
march, the prosecution reused the same evidence or facts from previous 
proceedings, this time reframing them to shift responsibility on to Baba. 
  The prosecution’s argument that Baba was responsible for the 
massacre demonstrates a potential interpretation of command responsibility 
as a strict liability. In asserting that Baba was responsible for the execution at 
Ranau, the prosecutor appeared to contend that a commander is required to 
exercise a very high degree of forethought: Baba ought to have known that 
Takakuwa would have no effective choice but to execute the prisoners. This 
extension of responsibility exceeds that which was imposed in the Yamashita 
case, and other command responsibility trials. In the Yamashita trial, the key 
issue was that the atrocities were so widespread that, in the court’s view, the 
commander ought to be held responsible.
29
 Yet in the Baba trial, the 
prosecution contended that responsibility should also be applied in isolated 
cases, not just where a pattern of atrocities could be established. There had 
not been a comparable massacre of prisoners during the previous march, and 
the basis of the charge against Baba in relation to the second march was that 
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he was mainly responsible for the deaths which occurred, because of 
improper planning, or wilful disregard. Attaching responsibility to Baba for 
the later massacre appears to be a move towards strict liability, in which he 
was held responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates, rather than 
for any action or inaction on his part. Yet the prosecutor framed the 
executions as a natural consequence of his action or inaction. Again, this 
approach shows the blending of the two interpretations of command 
responsibility, signalling either confusion as to how exactly the doctrines 
operated, or a convenient method of convicting senior officers.  
  Unlike the previous trials of junior officers accused of responsibility 
for the Sandakan-Ranau atrocities, the Baba trial concerned command 
responsibility only, without combining it with direct participation in crimes. 
This meant that for the court properly to convict Baba, the doctrine needed to 
be fully understood, and deployed in a consistent manner. The substantial 
discussion of how much Baba had known of the condition of the prisoners 
and the results of the first march demonstrates that the charge was conceived 
by the court as a separate offence of the superior, as advised by the JA in 
previous trials. On the other hand, interpreting the charge as a strict liability 
meant that the prosecution could connect Baba to a greater number of crimes. 
This latter interpretation, though not fully imposed in connection to all the 
elements, was at least used to a limited degree. The mixing of approaches 
demonstrates two related things. First, the doctrine was still new, and did not 
have a fully established interpretation. As a result, second, prosecutors were 




in securing convictions, and prosecutors would use whichever version of the 
doctrine best suited their purposes at any particular time.   
 





Japanese military forces committed atrocious crimes against Allied prisoners 
of war in the period 1941-1945. After the conflict, the Allied authorities were 
determined to exact justice for the crimes, not only from the soldiers who had 
mistreated and killed prisoners, but also from the more senior officers who 
had issued the relevant orders or who, at the least, had allowed the crimes to 
occur, by failing to prevent or punish mistreatment and murder. The doctrine 
of command responsibility was a major tool in this endeavour, and it was 
enthusiastically embraced by Australian military prosecutors and courts. 
  In the late 1940s command responsibility was still a relatively novel 
doctrine, and it had no single, established interpretation. As the trials 
examined in this thesis show, the lack of a definitive interpretation made it 
possible for the prosecution and the courts to use the doctrine of command 
responsibility very freely. The aim was usually to secure convictions against 
those considered responsible by reason of their position for crimes against 
Allied prisoners. For this purpose, strict liability was the safest approach: a 
commander was simply held responsible for his subordinates’ crimes. On 
occasion, however, prosecutors and courts departed from the strict liability 
version of command responsibility. The doctrine could be tempered in its 
application to those who were seen to have had limited control over atrocities. 
Thus, the apparently strict liability imposed on junior officers was sometimes 
qualified by reason of superior orders, or degree of command. When very 
senior officers were tried with command responsibility, the charge was 
generally interpreted not as imposing a strict liability, but as a separate 
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offence of the superior, an approach which, at least potentially, allowed a 
greater range of defence arguments, and hence did not automatically imply 
guilt. This approach was probably conditioned by the controversy over the 
Yamashita case, and the corresponding inclination to demonstrate that justice 
was being done in subsequent cases. Yet these qualifications of the doctrine 
of command responsibility did not fully erode the application of strict liability 
by prosecutors, when they held it to be necessary to bring to justice those they 
considered to hold most responsibility for war crimes.  
  The trial of Takakuwa and Watanabe provides an illustration of a 
limited interpretation of command responsibility, in which the commander, 
Takakuwa, was held responsible for orders he gave to his subordinates. This 
is a clear and uncontroversial application of the doctrine. In the same trial, 
however, command responsibility was applied in a far more controversial 
manner: Watanabe was held to be unqualifiedly responsible for the conduct 
of his subordinates, and to be held strictly liable for their conduct. The court 
and the prosecutor applied both of these approaches to command 
responsibility in the joint trial of Takakuwa and Watanabe, which suggests 
that there was no issue with deploying multiple interpretations of the doctrine 
simultaneously.  
  Hoshijima’s trial for his role in the atrocities at the Sandakan POW 
Camp shows that the command responsibility doctrine was not always fully 
utilised, even when it was available. Hoshijima had undeniably been a direct 
participant in the majority of the crimes for which he was charged. Thus, 
there was no need to invoke command responsibility at his trial: his 
conviction was assured on far simpler grounds. Ample evidence of a direct 
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nature was available to support the prosecutor’s case, and so the tentative 
plan to use command responsibility was abandoned. The prosecutor in the 
Takakuwa and Watanabe trial had invoked command responsibility because 
there was no evidence which would secure Watanabe’s conviction. 
Hoshijima, on the other hand, had convicted himself as an actual participant 
in crimes, and so this argument was set aside in favour of a more direct one.  
  The Yamamoto trial applied command responsibility at multiple 
levels. The prosecutor and the Judge Advocate in the first trial, at Labuan, 
both argued that the doctrine ought to be applied in some way to officers who 
had been able to exercise some level of discretion. Culpability was attributed 
to the immediate superior officer connected to a crime. The junior officers in 
this trial were held to a strict liability, even when they had not had full control 
over the actions of their subordinates because they, the junior officers, were 
subject to superior orders. The results of the Labuan trial showed the court’s 
unwillingness to accept superior orders as a mitigating factor when applied to 
a command responsibility charge. This trial also showed the prosecutor 
broadly applying the doctrine of command responsibility to secure 
convictions.  
The retrial of Yamamoto and the others at Rabaul reversed the strict 
liability to which the junior officers had been held. This time, the court, 
against the argument of both the prosecutor and the Judge Advocate, deemed 
that superior orders did mitigate the culpability of the junior officers, 
probably because those orders had limited the exercise of discretion in their 
command. The decision making authorities in this case showed some 
refinement in their application of command responsibility, finding that a 
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broad, unqualified responsibility of a superior officer was not always present 
in a chain of command. The court probably took this stance because it had 
already assigned full culpability to the two senior officers in this trial, and 
because it recognised that the application of a strict liability, where junior 
officers were acting under orders, was a questionable use of the command 
responsibility doctrine. The change in treatment of the case by the two 
different courts shows that application of the doctrine could vary, even within 
a short period of time and in the face of the same crime and the same 
evidence.  
  The trial of Baba Masao confirms that, at least in senior officer trials, 
the prosecution was mostly willing to apply the doctrine of command 
responsibility as a separate offence of the superior, where such an argument 
could be made. Yet, in this case, the prosecutor apparently still attempted to 
hold Baba strictly liable for crimes of which he could not have been expected 
to have had any knowledge. It is impossible to know whether the court agreed 
with the prosecution on this matter, because we do not know the reasons for 
the court’s judgment. However, the point still stands that strict liability 
arguments held superior officers to a higher standard than did arguments 
embracing command responsibility as a separate offence of the superior, and 
each of these arguments was used as needed by the prosecutor. As we have 
seen, in some respects the arguments about Baba’s responsibility extended 
beyond even the arguments used against General Yamashita Tomoyuki. It is 
unlikely, however, that prosecutors were deliberately attempting to extend the 
liability established in the Yamashita case. The prosecution’s overriding goal, 
in the Baba trial and all the trials analysed in this thesis, was to secure the 
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convictions of commanding officers for atrocities against Allied prisoners of 
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